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The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the development of a systematic, Marxian approach to 
the  content  and  contradictions  of  contemporary  credit  relations.  It  does  this  by  abandoning 
traditional  Marxian  analyses of  credit based  on  “monied  capitalists”  as  well  as  the  traditional 
understanding of credit as “the great regulator” of the velocity of money. Instead it considers the ex 
nihilo issuance of bank liabilities as the characteristic form taken by advanced credit relations. The 
paper approaches this form of credit on the basis of three Marxian analytical elements: the circuit-
of-capital  conceptualisation  of  accumulation,  the  understanding  of  money as  the  most general 
embodiment  of  value  and  foremost  store  of  wealth,  and  characterisations  of  the  market  and 
institutional foundations for the circulation of different forms of credit money. On these bases it 
offers  distinctive  insights  into  the  content,  limits  and  inherent  contradictions  posed  by credit 
relations  that  are  unavailable  to  existing  deliberate  analyses  of  credit  money  in  capitalist 
accumulation.1
The paper’s systemic approach to the ex nihilo issuance of bank liabilities in accumulation leads to 
a distinctive appreciation of financial intermediation. Capitalist accumulation requires capital value 
to express itself recurrently in the form of idle money holdings. At the same time, it ensures the 
systematic  existence  of  investment  opportunities  facing  capitalists  lacking  sufficient monetary 
means to  undertake them.  The  credit system  dynamically mediates between these  two inherent 
features of accumulation by creating its own forms of money, backed by claims on borrowers, that 
are accepted as suitable monetary embodiments for capital, and as stores of wealth. In this context, 
money hoards in the circuit of capital (and circuits of personal revenue) fundamentally condition 
the  pace  of  credit  extension.  Their  magnitude  and  distribution  relative  to  production  and 
3
1 Notable among the later are the contributions of Circuitists. See Lavoie (1992) and Graziani (2003). consumption plans conditions net credit demand. The composition in which capitalists and workers 
wish to hold them conditions the ability of the credit system to accommodate that demand. 
Issuers of monetary liabilities thus need to establish and defend their circulation as embodiments of 
value. This is done most generally through portfolio management. Issuers also maintain fractional 
reserve  holdings of more general forms of money, and offer varying  terms of convertibility and 
rates of interest on their liabilities. Significantly, this includes Central Monetary Authorities, which 
need to establish the circulation of their liabilities among capitalists in a position to withdraw value 
from  the  national  economy.  This  need  conditions  monetary policy  and  compels  the  CMA to 
maintain reserves of a world money of international settlements. Against this backdrop, the interest 
rate on loans will be understood to hinge on the rates of interest needed to sustain the circulation of 
domestic liabilities given existing preferences for different money forms, as well as on the costs and 
profits of the banking sector. This results in a distinctive loanable funds approach to interest-rate 
determination,  in  which  the  supply  of  bank  credit  is  directly  conditioned  by  the  portfolio 
preferences of money holders over money forms with different social content or liquidity. 
Credit  contributes  to  the  accumulation  of  capital  while  simultaneously  creating  distinctive 
contradictions.  If  positive  paces  of  net  credit  extension  are  sustained,  they  boost  dynamic 
profitability by boosting the pace of sales and reducing relative the size of commodity inventories. 
This  ability is  constrained  by  dynamic  productive  capacities,  which  limit  the  pace  at  which 
inventories are fed. It is also tempered by the credit and monetary risks created by credit relations. 
Since bank liabilities supported by bank assets come to be held as monetary embodiments of capital 
value, disruptions to the sale of commodities will threaten not only the realisation of value taking 
the  form  of unsold commodities, but also capital value  in monetary form. Finally, the ability of 
credit relations to boost profitability also exacerbates, and gives rise to distinctive disruptions over 
the capitalist business cycle.
4The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  two  locates  money flows  and  stocks  within  the  core 
processes of capitalist reproduction: the circuit of capital and attendant circuits of personal revenue. 
Section three traces the endogenous development of credit relations from commercial to banking 
credit, discussed the market foundations for the circulation of different forms of credit money, and 
characterises the constraints on the ability of the credit system to accommodate any given pace of 
net credit extension demanded by capitalists. Section four critically discusses the impact of credit 
relations on accumulation as understood in traditional Marxian analyses, the contributions of credit 
that  may  be  identified  on  the  basis  of  the  approach  taken  here,  and  the  contradictions  they 
inherently pose. Section five concludes.
2. The Circuit of Capital and Money
This  section  lays  the  bases  for  approaching  capitalist  credit  relations  by offering  a  systemic 
conceptualisation of money and its circulation in capitalist reproduction based on Marx’s circuit of 
capital. The self-expansion of capital value requires it to be expressed successively as stocks of 
input and unfinished output commodities, unsold inventories, and money hoards. Money offers the 
most general  expression of capital value  among  these  stocks. Monetary profits are  the  defining 
purpose of the  circuit, and their capitalisation is the  driving  force of accumulation. Money also 
mediates the  circuits  of revenue  of workers  and  capitalists qua  consumers,  where  it may also 
function as a store of wealth. While evolving according to their own logic, the circuits of revenue 
originate  and  terminate in the  circuit of capital. The discussion  offers a characterisation  of the 
circulation of money successively through circuits of capital and circuits of revenue in the process 
of reproduction.
52.1 The Circuit of Capital
Marxian political economy conceptualises capitalist social reproduction at the aggregate level on 
the basis of the circuit of capital, a schematisation of the moments and forms taken by capital value 
as it seeks self-expansion. For a single pulse of value this process takes the form, 
M − C(lp,mp)− P − C'− M ' > M   (2.1)
Capitalists advance value in monetary form  M as investment in input commodities labour power   
and means of production (lp and mp respectively). These are deployed and used in the process of 
production P which  yields output commodities C' that are  subsequently sold for  a  quantity of 
money M '. The entire process is driven by the expectation that, on the sale of output, M ' > M,
which hinges on the creation of surplus value from the employment of labour power in production 
and  its realisation  in the  form  of monetary profits in  commodity exchange.  Positive  monetary 
profits allow the recommitment of value to the circuit in growing scales, and are the fundamental 
bases for positive rates of accumulation. 
More broadly, the passage of time as value flows through the various moments of  process (2.1) is 
of  fundamental  economic  significance.  Marx  devoted  considerable  time  to  the  analysis  of  the 
technical, social and economic determinants of the pace at which value flows through production, 
sale, and investment. The time lags involved in the flow of value across all phases of the circuit 
define the circuit’s turnover time, most broadly understood as a measure of the average time it takes 
a pulse of value to transverse the entire process. Turnover time is a crucial, if often overlooked, 
determinant of the dynamic profitability of capital.
6Time lags in the flow of value ensure  the existence of dynamic stocks of value in the form  of 
unfinished output commodities, inventories, and monetary hoards. These three stocks of  capital 
constitute total capital value engaged in the circuit. Its size relative to profit flows directly defines 
the  profitability of social capital and consequently the pace of accumulation. The character and 
determinants of production, sales and investment lags are  thus a  central concern for analysis of 
accumulation. 
The production of commodity outputs also takes place over time, in accordance with technological 
conditions and social struggles over the pace of work. Alongside the composition of capital, time 
lags in production define the productivity of labour in Marxian political economy.2 Once produced, 
the pace at which finished commodities are sold will depend on the state of demand, which is most 
generally conditioned  by the  pace  of capitalist investment,  and  by the  pace  at which  personal 
revenues are spent. 
Once commodities are sold the recommitment of fractions of revenues to investment also suffers 
from time lags, whose economic content is discussed below. As a result of these lags, the circuit of 
capital exhibits idle stocks of value in the form of money hoards alongside stocks of unfinished 
commodities and inventories. The relative size of these stocks is variable and conditioned by the 
relative  severity  of  the  corresponding  time  lags,  which  in  turn  reflect  the  relative  pace  of 
investment, the time productivity of labour, and the pace of demand. These naturally vary over the 
business cycle, resulting in corollary variations in the relative composition of total social capital. In 
the  circuit of capital, productivity, expectations of profitability, and the pace of demand will be 
reflected in the relative sizes of the three component parts of total capital in circulation. 
7
2 See Saad-Filho (2002), Chapter 6,  for instance. Credit and broader financial  relations  directly act upon  capital  value  engaged  in  the  sphere  of 
circulation in the form of inventories and money hoards. They regulate the quantity and velocity of 
money,  thus  conditioning  the  pace  of  demand  flows  and  the  size  of  inventories  of  unsold 
commodities. At the  broadest level  credit and  financial  relations help shape  the  profitability of 
social capital, by conditioning the flow of sales that realise profits and the overall stock of capital 
value  in  circulation.  They will  typically boost profitability,  thus  establishing  a  foundation  for 
financial revenues and profits, while simultaneously creating  new potential sources of instability 
and disruptions to the process of accumulation. 
2.2 Money in the Circuit
Money is asked to perform a series of functions for aggregate social capital. At the beginning of an 
individual  circuit it exists as  the  most general  embodiment of  capital. Once  it is advanced to 
purchase  input commodities, the  capital  value  it embodied  remains in  the  circuit, no longer in 
monetary form, but as hired labour power and means of production. The original money, having 
been advanced as investment, will now exist as the realised output value for the producers of the 
purchased  means  of  production,  and  as  the  wage  income  of  workers  engaged  in  the  original 
investment. 
Capitalists  who  sold  to  the  borrower  will  recommit  fractions  of  their  sales  revenues  to 
accumulation, eventually adding to the aggregate value initiating process (2.1). But some of their 
revenues will  finance  capitalist consumption. Together with  the  money wages also  received  by 
workers employed by the borrower, these capitalist consumption funds temporarily exit the circuit 
of capital, entering  the circuits of revenue of workers and of capitalists qua consumers. In those 
circuits, money may be held for some time as a store of wealth. While this results in the formation 
of money hoards outside  of the circuit of capital, these  money holdings are  not indefinite. The 
8money in question will eventually fund consumption, or the acquisition of securities. It eventually 
flows to capitalist enterprises, and some of it may be used to start the circuit anew. 
As mentioned above, money also  appears as a hoard  in the circuit of capital, held between its 
receipt as revenues and its recommitment to accumulation as investment. It also appears as a hoard 
in  the  circuits  of  revenue  of  workers  and  capitalists  qua  consumers.  Two  distinct  analytical 
emphases at different levels of  abstraction  may be  identified  in  Marxian  approaches to money 
hoards. 
First, hoards develop as a  consequence of  money’s role  as the  general equivalent possessing  a 
monopoly over the ability to buy.3 Money can always buy commodities, whereas the sale of any 
given commodity is not always possible and seldom timely. As such, money serves as the foremost 
store  of  value. Considering  the  abstraction of  simple  commodity circulation  and  a  commodity 
monetary  system,  Marx  (1867)  identifies  in  money  hoards  a  potential  source  of  economic 
disruption, as a sale need not always be followed by a purchase. As such they are at the heart of his 
rejection of Say’s Law. They also underlie his rejection of Ricardo’s Quantity Theory. Since the 
money commodity has a value, and the velocity of money is at that level of abstraction taken to be 
inelastically conditioned by customs and tradition, it is the quantity of money in circulation that 
adjusts endogenously to levels adequate for the circulation of existing commodities. Money hoards 
effectively act as buffer stocks whose evolution is shaped by arbitrage opportunities posed by any 
significant misalignment between  money prices and the  values of commodities and commodity 
money. 
Second,  at  the  more  concrete  level  of  analysis  of  capitalist  reproduction,  money  hoards  are 
approached explicitly in relation to their origins and role in the circuit of capital.4 Money hoards are 
9
3 See de Brunhoff (1979).
4 As may be done on the bases offered by Hilferding (1910), Uno (1980) and Itoh and Lapavisas (1999). understood as temporary ‘leaks’ of value from the circuit of capital. Four broad reasons giving rise 
to such leaks may be identified in Marx’s work. First, precautionary money reserves are held to 
guard against fluctuations in prices and, more significantly, demands for settlement of existing debt 
claims. Second, even after the investment decision is taken, actual disbursements for inputs are not 
instantaneous as the purchase of inputs is necessarily gradual. Third, depreciation funds are held in 
order to self-finance lumpy fixed capital investment. And fourth, ‘accumulation funds’ accrue from 
sales revenues before their recommitment to investment, which requires sufficient confidence in the 
prospects for profitability.
Accumulation funds and money reserves held against future demands for settlement and purchases 
define  capitalist  credit  and  financial  relations.  As  in  Keynesian  and  some  post-Keynesian 
approaches, Marxian political economy understands these hoards as the foundation for all credit and 
financial relations. Unlike Keynesian and Post-Keynesian contributions, in which emphasis in the 
analysis of money hoards is placed on subjective preferences, expectations and motives behind the 
portfolio decisions of investors, Marxian analyses privilege their broad social  foundations in the 
very properties of money and the inherent contradictions posed by the self-augmentation of capital 
value. 
The  self-expansion  of value  in monetary form  is the  explicit purpose  of  the  circuit of  capital. 
Monetary profits provide the most socially general  measure of its success. But in order to self-
expand, value in monetary form must lose its generality and take the form of commodities. Those 
commodities represent less social forms of value as they do not possess the ability to buy. The are 
also  incapable  of  discharging  obligations,  that is,  of  functioning  as  means of  payment.  Their 
transformation into augmented monetary value hinges on the fraught social  processes of surplus 
value creation in production, and its realisation as monetary profits in output markets. 
10From  the  standpoint  of  Marxian  political  economy  the  significance  of  the  resulting  loss  of 
generality and uncertainty is analytically prior to and broader than how it is perceived and managed 
by individual  capitalists. It follows from the contradiction  posed  by the  fact that under general 
capitalist conditions the accumulation of wealth and social power take the form of accumulation of 
money, while  simultaneously requiring that money itself become  something  other  than  money. 
Financial  development may mitigate  this contradiction. Capital  markets allow the conversion of 
security holdings into money at any point in time without disrupting the circuit of capital generating 
returns.5 Short-term credit markets and arranged overdraft facilities may often reduce the perceived 
need for money holdings. Yet these developments cannot eliminate the need for money holdings as 
the  very object and measure  of  accumulation.  Neither  can  they eliminate  the  need for  money 
holdings as a protection from the inherent vicissitudes and uncertainties of accumulation.
Finally, the lags in the investment of capitalist revenues and related money hoards are expected to 
show considerable variation over the business cycle. All four ‘leaks’ associated  with them may 
diminish in relative size during upswings, as rising confidence in expected profits quickens the pace 
of own investment and reduces the relative size of various reserve funds. As a consequence sales are 
quicker, more of social capital will be sunk in  the form  of commodities, and relatively smaller 
volumes of it will  exist in the more  general money form. This enhances aggregate profitability, 
while simultaneously increasing the risk of destructive interruptions to the chain of payments once a 
crisis occurs,
“On  the  eve  of  the  crisis,  the  bourgeois,  with  the  self-sufficiency  that  springs  from 
intoxicating  prosperity, declares money to be  a  vain imagination.  Commodities alone  are 
11
5 While also creating new modes of appropriation from surplus value and new sources of potential instability. See dos 
Santos (2009) and Lapavitsas and Levina (2011). money. But now the cry is everywhere: money alone is a commodity! As the heart pants after 
fresh water, so pants his soul after money, the only wealth.”6
Notably this creates coordination problems given the private and competitive character of capitalist 
relations. The potential benefits of generalised individual increases in the pace of own investment 
and reductions in relative liquidity levels accrue to all capitalists, but the resulting risks are borne by 
individual  capitalists. There are thus no assurances investment lags will be  small, even though 
capital as a whole would benefit from those. As put by Kalecki (1967), “capitalists do many things 
as a class, but they certainly do not invest as a class”. 
3. The Monetary Constraints on Credit
As the discussion above makes clear, money is an integral part of capitalist reproduction, as seen 
from the  perspective of the circuit of capital. It is easy to motivate how credit relations too are 
integral to the accumulation of capital. In the Marxian system the capitalisation of monetary profits 
is  understood  as  the  driver  of  the  process  of  accumulation.  Accumulation  imposes  growing 
requirements on  the  supply of all  commodity forms  taken  by capital. This includes increasing 
demand for labour power and means of production, which is met with characteristic contradictions.7 
Capitalised profits represent a net addition to total value taking the form of money in the economy. 
Their existence requires growing monetary means of expression for capital value. This observation 
became the foundation for early underconsumptionist appreciations of the limits and contradictions 
of capitalism. This was most clearly formulated by Luxemburg (1921), who asked “Where do the 
capitalists get this money to realize the capitalized surplus value?” For her, “this money” had no 
endogenous sources in capitalism, which was thus forced to obtain it from “third parties” in rural 
12
6 Marx (1867), p 155.
7 Including possible erosions in profitability arising from rising real wages as labour markets tighten. Some 
contributions have also emphasised potential problems in ensuring the correct proportions between capital and 
consumption goods are maintained in accumulation, including Hilferding (1910). areas and in markets conquered in spheres of imperialist influence. Drawing extensively on Part V 
of  the  third  volume  of  Capital,  Bukharin  (1924)  offered  the  first  explicit  rejection  of  such 
arguments, pointing to increases in the velocity of money, the production of money commodities, 
dishoarding, and credit relations as systematic sources for expanding means of monetary expression 
for capital value.8 
The  first three  of these, however, cannot provide the bases for sustainable growth in means for 
monetary expression of capital value. The velocity of money cannot increase indefinitely. Even if 
all consumption expenditures are instantaneous, social capital cannot exist with arbitrarily small 
holdings of money relative to capital value in the form of non-monetary commodities. Social capital 
would need to bear indefinitely growing  levels of illiquidity. Dishoarding cannot be a systematic 
source  of  monetary growth,  as  it relies  on  previous  withdrawals of  circulating  media  through 
hoarding. Finally, even when the production of precious metals and minting formed the foundation 
of monetary systems,  there is no reason to expect those ever to have proceed in the paces needed to 
sustain the growing investment plans of capitalists. 
Capitalist accumulation  thus  requires  credit  relations,  which  develop endogenously  as  part  of 
capitalist investment plans. Existing capitalist money holdings will systematically prove insufficient 
to support growing scales of investment, sustaining  a regular demand for credit. Credit relations 
arise  and  develop in  response  to  this  demand,  in  the  first instance  as  commercial  credit  that 
functions as a substitute for money, and later as its generalisation, banking credit, which gives rise 
to credit money. The difficulties attendant to capitalist monetary expansion are not taken here to 
subject accumulation to systematic tendencies to “underconsumption”. They are taken to subject it 
to recurrent credit and monetary crises, taking  place in their own right or as moments of broader 
disruptions to profitability.
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8 See Day (1980), for instance.  This section lays out a distinctive Marxian approach to credit relations and the monetary structure 
upon  which  they rest.  Credit  relations  are  approached  on  the  basis  of  an  integration  of  two 
analytical elements pursued in Marx’s own work. First, understanding  banking  credit as a logical 
and  historical  generalisation  of commercial credit. Second, understanding  money hoards in  the 
circuit of capital, and secondarily those in circuits of revenue, as the foundation for credit relations. 
Those  hoards  are  taken  to  support  credit  relations,  but  not  as  a  source  of  deposits  that  are 
subsequently  loaned  out.  They  support  credit  relations  by  creating  dynamic  scopes  for  the 
circulation  of  bank  liabilities  issued  ex  nihilo,  to  the  extent  those  liabilities  are  accepted  by 
capitalists and workers as embodiments of capital and stores of wealth.
The  section  also  discusses  the  broad  monetary structure  defined  by  credit  relations,  in  which 
monetary claims with varying  degrees of social generality enjoy varying  degrees of circulation. 
Bank liabilities circulate domestically alongside a more general credit money issued by a Central 
Monetary Authority (CMA), which invariably comes to be  part of the  capitalist state. Domestic 
money circulates  alongside  a  world  money of  international  settlements  among  capitalists  in  a 
position  to  withdraw  value  from  the  domestic  economy.  Each  form  of  money establishes  its 
circulation through distinctive market and institutional foundations. The ability of the credit system 
to accommodate any given pace of credit extension will depend on its ability to maintain these 
foundations.  The  resulting  pace  of  net  credit  extension  is  subject  to  a  series  of  concrete 
determinations,  including  existing  capitalist  appetite  to  hold  bank  liabilities  as  capital,  the 
profitability of private  banks, the  ultimately political  goals governing  monetary policy, and the 
economy’s external commodity and capital flows. 
143.1 Commercial and Banking Credit
In Marxian political economy banking credit is understood as a generalisation of commercial credit, 
which  emerges  spontaneously between  capitalists,  typically those  engaged  in  the  same  supply 
chain.9  Commercial  credit consists of various forms of promissory notes issued  by purchasing 
capitalists in lieu of payment with money. Such notes may enjoy a degree of circulation, commonly 
within a given supply chain: their original recipient may be able to endorse the notes and use them 
to purchase inputs from another capitalist. To the extent that they do, promissory notes reduce the 
need for money equal to their own measure in the circulation of commodities along the chain. They 
also speed up sales, which may now take place before the buyer secures sufficient money revenues 
for the purchase. 
There  are  unsurmountable  limits  to  these  benefits.  The  issuance,  circulation  and  clearing  of 
promissory notes can never do away with the need for money settlements (and thus holdings). It is 
impossible for all claims issued by individual capitalists across all branches of the economy to net 
out to zero over any time period.10 Further, the economic and social bases of promissory notes are 
too narrow to permit them to function as full-fledged money themselves. Ultimately, they are claims 
on  a  single  issuing  enterprise,  supported  by a  small  number  of  endorsers.  Issues of  trust will 
typically limit their circulation to the supply chain in which they originated.11 Revealingly, they do 
not terminally settle obligations, as attested by the historical practice of endorsing  a note before 
using it to purchase, pointing to a residual claim on the endorser.  
Capitalist banking  business  develops  historically  atop  commercial  credit relations,  as  bankers 
advance their own liabilities in the discounting of promissory notes. Banking credit transcends the 
central  limitations  of  commercial  credit.  Asset  diversification  by  individual  banks  and  the 
15
9 See Itoh and Lapavitsas (1999) for an extensive discussion. 
10 See de Brunhoff (1979). 
11 See Lapavitsas (2003). development of the  interbank  market bestow on  the  liabilities of  private  banks a  considerably 
broader social foundation than the IOUs of individual capitals.12 Claims on banks are supported by 
claims  on  countless  borrowers  in  the  economy,  and  become,  in  fact,  a  form  of  money.  Two 
important consequences follow. First, if banking credit is a generalisation of commercial credit, the 
demand for credit by functioning capitalists is logically prior to its accommodation by the banking 
system, even when both are expressed simultaneously. 
Second, the use of bank liabilities in discounting implies their acceptance as a means of discharging 
existing  credit claims. Put differently, they are a means of payment. As such, they may also be 
advanced ex nihilo not only as money-capital to initiate or augment individual circuits of capital, 
which is the characteristic form taken by banking credit in contemporary capitalism, but also as 
means to settle payment obligations.13 The ability of banks to advance their own liabilities for those 
purposes hinges on the willingness of capitalists to accept claims on private banks as the monetary 
realisation of the value of their output commodities. This will also condition workers’ willingness to 
accept bank liabilities as wages, as those are accepted as payment for consumption goods. 
The  acceptability and  circulation of  bank  liabilities  fundamentally rests on the  quality of bank 
assets, which hinges on the ability of borrowers to make good on their obligations to banks. It also 
rests on capital reserves that allow banks themselves to make good on their obligations to holders of 
their liabilities should some  borrowers default. Finally, it will  also hinge  on perceptions of the 
ability of the banking system to honour promises of convertibility into CMA liabilities. 
Conventional Marxian discussions of credit relations will often emphasise their role in mobilising 
deposits that are subsequently channelled into loans.14 The view taken here is that deposit making is 
16
12 Ibid. 
13 See Marx’s polemics with Tooke and Fullarton in Chapter 28 of Volume III of Capital in this connection. 
14 See Marx Vol III, Ch 33, or Hilferding (1910) p 79-80, or Uno (1980) Chapter 3, for instance. logically secondary to the more general creation of credit money. The ex nihilo advance of bank 
liabilities  that  are  subsequently held  as capital  (and  as  other  stores  of  value)  offers  the  most 
developed mechanism for accelerating sales and reducing the relative volume of social capital value 
tied up as inventories. If capitalists are exchanging parts of their cash holdings for bank liabilities,   
by definition bank liabilities are being accepted as monetary expressions of capital. But if that is the 
case, the credit system does not need to wait for deposits in order to advance loans. Capitalists 
selling to borrowers or to their workers will accept bank liabilities as a means of payment, and hold 
on to them as part of their capital. The acquisition or disposal of bank deposits in this context are 
mere adjustments in portfolios in line with existing preferences for bank liabilities or more social 
forms of money. 
Capitalist financial intermediation takes on its defining content in this context. Hoards in the circuit 
of capital, as well as those in circuits of revenue, create dynamic scopes for the circulation of credit-
system liabilities, to the extent that those are accepted as an embodiment of capital and a store of 
value. On the basis of this circulation, banks may advance their own liabilities to initiate or augment 
circuits not currently in  possession of  sufficient volumes of  money capital.  The  credit system 
dynamically mediates between the inherent need for a part of social capital to exist in the form of 
idle money, and the existence of potentially profitable  avenues for investment lacking  sufficient 
own money capital. It does so by creating  its own  forms of  money,  backed by claims on  all 
borrowers, that are accepted as suitable monetary embodiments for capital, as stores of wealth, and 
as  means  of  payment.  This  mediation  rests  upon  and  defines  distinctive  capitalist  monetary 
structures, and introduces new, concrete determinations and contradictions to the management of 
money hoards in capitalism.
173.2 The Market and Monetary Constraints on on Endogenous Credit
The approach outlined above points not only to the endogeneity of credit money, but also to the 
irreducibly monetary requirements  and  constraints bearing  on  credit  relations.  In  the  Marxian 
framework, money hoards in the circuit of capital and in circuits of revenue represent the demand 
for  money by capitalist producers and  consumers,  as  well  as of  workers.  They fundamentally 
condition the pace of net credit extension: The magnitude and distribution of these hoards relative 
to  production and consumption  plans  conditions net credit demand. The  composition  in which 
capitalists  and  workers  wish  to  hold  them  conditions  the  ability  of  the  credit  system  to 
accommodate that demand. 
Consider first the aggregate relationship between the relative magnitude of money hoards and the 
demand for credit. It is evident that if aggregate money holdings are too small to support production 
and consumption plans, net credit demand will increase. Conversely, suppose first that circuits of 
revenue  contain  money in  excess of  levels needed  for  consumption  and  as  stores of  value.  If 
consumption lending takes place, workers and capitalist consumers may use the excess to quicken 
the  pace  of debt repayment. In that case, excess supply of credit money would be dynamically 
eliminated by tapering future demand for credit. Workers and capitalist consumers may also drain 
the excess by acquiring securities or other claims on capitalist enterprises, which would end up with 
the undesired money stocks. 
Consider now capitalist producers. If enterprises find themselves with money stocks in excess of 
current needs, capitalists will  effectively adjust their  portfolios,  moving  the  relative  balance  of 
capital values in money and commodity form in line with their current plans. This may take place as 
capitalists  increase  the  pace  of  investment,  if  profitable  opportunities exist and  are  identified, 
thereby increasing relative volumes of capital value in commodity form. It may also take place as 
capitalists  increase  the  pace  of  debt  repayment  and  moderate  the  dynamic  pace  of  net credit 
18demand. As noted by Goodhart (1989), any pace of credit and money creation in excess of existing 
demand for money, “sets up subsequent portfolio readjustments involving purchases/sales of a wide 
range of goods, services, and assets, until full equilibrium is restored.”15 In the approach taken here, 
“equilibrium” is given by desired levels of money hoards in the circuits of capital and revenue. 
Along  similar lines, and  with  greater significance  for  the  contradictions of  credit relations, the 
composition in which capitalists and workers wish to hold their money fundamentally conditions 
the  ability of  the  credit system  to  accommodate  any  given  level  of  net  credit  demand.  The 
development  of  capitalist  credit  relations  gives  rise  to  a  hierarchy  of  money  forms,  whose 
circulation  is ensured upon  different market foundations. Despite  considerable  institutional  and 
historical variations, capitalist credit systems have broadly defined and rested upon a three-tiered 
monetary structure. 
Liabilities of the private banking system constitute the least general form of money. The ultimate 
market foundation for their circulation are bank assets and capital reserves. It is further supported 
by convertibility into more general CMA liabilities, which requires the maintenance of fractional 
reserve holdings. Significantly, banks seek to boost their circulation by offering various schedules 
of interest rates paid to their holders and terms of convertibility. 
Marxian  political  economy  has  offered  distinctive  insights  into  the  market  and  institutional 
foundations for  the  circulation  of CMA liabilities.16  The  development of the  interbank market 
boosts the circulation of bank liabilities, as the mutual exchange of claims ensure the assets of any 
given bank include claims on other banks. In addition, interbank lending generally allows banks to 
address quickly any temporary liquidity shortfalls. The development of the interbank market is thus 
central to the emergence of bank liabilities as money. The CMA emerges as the dominant institution 
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15 Goodhart (1989), p 33. 
16 See Lapavitsas (1997), Itoh and Lapavitsas (1999) and Lapavitsas and Saad-Filho (2000). in the interbank market. It oversees interbank settlements, and its defining responsibility is ensuring 
the smooth functioning  of that market and of banks issuing  liabilities in it. Its liabilities come to 
settle interbank balances, and are supported by claims on all money-market banks in the economy. 
As such, they are the most general and social form of credit money in the domestic economy.   
With the development of capitalism the CMA becomes part of the capitalist state, which further 
supports the domestic circulation of its liabilities by defining them as legal tender and the means of 
discharging tax obligations. In Marxian political economy this support is secondary to the market 
foundations for the circulation of CMA liabilities. The significance of this point should be clear 
from the fact that the domestic legal-tender status of CMA liabilities has no international purchase, 
and may also be undermined during periods of monetary crises and severe instability by domestic 
currency substitution. The CMA must thus sustain the circulation of its liabilities among capitalists 
in a position to withdraw value from the domestic economy. To accomplish this, it seeks to ensure 
the  sound functioning  of the interbank market and  institutions active  in it. As a  result it must 
oversee  and  intervene  to  support overall  capitalist  profitability,  upon  which  all  domestic  loan 
repayments hinge. 
The CMA will also support the circulation of its liabilities by holding reserves of a world money 
that settles international obligations.17 It typically centralises domestic holdings of world money, the 
aggregate levels of which evolve in line with international trade and financial flows. While strains 
on international  reserves are  only evident during  crises of international payments, no CMA can 
afford to ignore  the rate of exchange  between its liabilities and world money. That rate directly 
conditions the international balances of trade and capital flows, profitability, and consequently the 
overall liquidity and solvency of the domestic credit system. Lastly, the CMA seeks to support the 
circulation  of its own liabilities by setting  the  terms  and  rates  at which  those are  available  to 
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17 See Vasudevan (2009) for a discussion of the institutional and broader political foundations for the concrete 
emergence of individual national currencies as forms of world money. domestic  banks,  which  will  in  turn  condition  rates  paid,  and  thus  demand,  for  all  domestic 
liabilities. 
3.3 The Accommodation of Credit Demand and Rates of Interest
The  ability  of  the  credit  system  to  accommodate  any  given  pace  of  net  credit  demand  is 
fundamentally conditioned by this monetary structure. As soon as credit is extended, new bank 
liabilities are advanced to workers hired by the borrower, and to capitalists selling  inputs to the 
borrower. These liabilities will begin flowing back to the banking system, both to service and pay 
down debt, and as holders adjust their money portfolios in line with their preferred levels of bank 
and CMA liabilities. Bank lending not only creates holdings of bank liabilities, but also creates 
demand on banks for CMA reserves. Additional gross demand for world money may also arise as 
fractions of new revenues flow outside the domestic economy, or new investment fuels demand for 
imports. 
Bank accommodation of demand for credit is driven by attempts to secure bank profits given the 
character of that demand, and the costs associated  with supplying  forms of money in line with 
preferences of money holders. The CMA sets the costs and terms at which it makes its liabilities 
available to the banking system. In  doing so it enjoys advantages following from the legal tender 
status of its liabilities. Those advantages may create  significant scopes for the  pursuit of varied 
political goals of the capitalist state through the conduct of monetary policy. These may conceivably 
include accommodating full employment and real wage growth or preventing  the development of 
asset bubbles, as well as the more currently fashionable targeting of inflation levels.18 But in any 
setting of convertibility, the pursuit of such goals will ultimately be secondary to establishing the 
market bases for the circulation of CMA liabilities. Thus the maintenance of aggregate profitability, 
21
18 See Epstein (2002), for instance. and even more so, the maintenance of stability in the interbank market, are the defining imperatives 
of monetary policy. 
Bank accommodation of credit demand may be formally characterised in relation to the monetary 
preferences and portfolio behaviour just described. Considering for simplicity a closed economy,   
suppose money holders are willing to hold a fraction d(t)  of their total holdings M(t)  in the form 
of bank liabilities D(t) , with the balance held as CMA liabilities H
C(t). Banks hold CMA reserves   
H






The balance-sheet choices of money holders and banks establish aggregate levels of illiquidity , 





Total  money in  circulation, understood to  be the result of  endogenous money creation may be 







This relationship may be expressed dynamically in relation to net changes in debt,
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 M(t) =  B(t) =
1
1− y(t)
 H(t)+  y(t)M(t) { }    (4)
In  line  with  an  endogenous  understanding  of  money creation,  equation  (4)  offers  a  dynamic 
description of the various manners in which the banking system may accommodate any given level 
of net credit demand. Higher paces of net credit extension  
 B(t)  may be accommodated with higher 
(or  rising)  levels  of  aggregate  illiquidity.  Banks may simply draw down  on  existing  reserves, 
increasing l(t) . They may also attempt to secure higher levels of d(t), offering combinations of 
higher interest rates on bank liabilities and different terms on their convertibility. As neither of these 
two methods are sustainable means of supporting  credit expansion in a growing  economy, banks 
must also avail themselves of new CMA liabilities at the going cost and terms. 
This monetary structure also affords characterisations of bank profits and of the determinants of 
interest rates on loans. At any point in time, aggregate bank profit flows will be conditioned by the 
volumes of credit outstanding, the rates paid on loans il(t) , deposits id(t)and reserves ir(t) , and the 
operational costs incurred, C(t),  
Π(t) = B(t)il(t)− D(t)id(t)− H
C(t)ir(t)− C(t)  (5)
This may be expressed in relation to the stock of money,
Π(t)
M(t)




23Bank profits arise from spreads between loan rates and average funding costs, net of the operational 
costs incurred in performing intermediation functions. 
Letting ϕ(t) measure  the  total  social  costs  of  intermediation,  consisting  of  bank  profits  and 
operational costs, relative to loans outstanding, equation (6) yields, 
il(t) = ϕ(t)+ d(t)id(t)+ (1− d(t))ir   (7)
Two observations are pertinent on this approach to the interest rate on loans. First, through the 
payment of  interest  on  loans,  credit relations  effect  a  redistribution  of  monetary profits.  This 
redistribution funds payments to holders of bank liabilities, covers intermediation costs and the 
profits of intermediaries, and includes a distinctive form of seignorage paid to the CMA. 
Second, it improves on conventional loanable-funds approaches to the interest rate by considering 
the  ex  nihilo  issuance  of  bank  liabilities  as  the  characteristic  form  of  credit  under  advanced 
capitalist conditions. The supply of credit is explicitly understood as conditioned by the evolving 
preferences of money holders over forms of money with different social content or liquidity. At the 
same  time,  the  approach  offered  here  improves  on  horizontalist  approaches.  Even  in  a  closed 
economy, in which by definition the  external constraints on the conduct of monetary policy are 
absent, the rate of interest on loans does not simply correspond to an  exogenous choice by the 
CMA. It is conditioned by the social costs of intermediation and average funding costs. The latter 
are determined by rates on CMA liabilities as well as by the rates needed to induce holdings of bank 
liabilities in line with profit-maximising  plans by banks. In this distinctive manner the “supply” 
behaviour of money holders and of financial intermediaries still conditions the determination of 
interest rates, even in a setting where credit is understood to take the form of the ex nihilo issuance 
of bank liabilities. 
244. Impact, Limits and Contradictions of Credit in Accumulation
Credit  relations  play  an  essential  part  in  the  process  of  capitalist  reproduction  by  boosting 
investment  and  supplying  growing  means for  the  monetary  expression  of  capital  value.  They 
consequently  boost  aggregate  demand,  quickening  the  pace  of  contemporaneous  sales  and 
realisation of profits, thus reducing inventories. If sustained, the expansion of credit consequently 
leads to higher rates  of profit and accumulation. This view is  at some  variance  with  those  of 
traditional Marxian approaches, in which credit is effectively taken as an increase in the aggregate 
pace of investment. As a result, credit relations are understood to effect “A [relative] reduction of 
circulation-capital in a capitalist society [which] undoubtedly means the corresponding increase of 
productive  capital,  and  consequently a  promotion  of  surplus-value  production.”19   This  section 
critically considers the applicability of this approach to credit systems based on ex nihilo issuance 
of bank liabilities. 
In  considering  the  impact  of  credit  relations  on  accumulation  the  section  also  discusses  the 
emergence of profit of enterprise, net of interest payment obligations, as the concrete imperative 
governing capitalist behaviour. In line with Marx’s approach, the very functioning of credit relations 
is understood to condition their limits and contradictions. Credit relations yield doubtless benefits 
for social capital, while simultaneously becoming a source of instability and potential disruptions to 
the accumulation of capital. This section concludes by motivating, along broad Marxian lines, the 
ways  in  which  credit  relations  and  the  payment  obligations  they create  exacerbate  and  give 
distinctive expression to broader industrial and commercial crises and the capitalist business cycle.  
4.1 Traditional Marxian Approaches
According to Marx (1894), by placing means of payment in the hands of capitalists ready to invest, 
credit relations make a range of contributions to the process of accumulation. First, it strengthens 
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19 Uno (1980), p 110. tendencies for the equalisation of profit rates across the economy. Second, it quickens the pace of 
sales and  reduces the  relative  size  of  inventories.  Both  these  mechanisms  are  at work  in  the 
approach to contemporary monetary systems taken here, with only minor technical qualifications.20 
Marx (1894) also argues that credit relations contribute to profitability by effecting  economies in 
the medium of circulation. These economies are understood to arise through three mechanisms: The 
circulation of credit notes reduces the circulation of metallic money, reducing its costly wear and 
tear;21 money is further “dematerialised” through the netting out of outstanding credit claims, which 
allows money to  disappear  from  many  transactions;  and  the  operations of  credit  increase  the 
velocity of money. These  economies, however, were motivated  in relation to monetary systems 
grounded on a commodity money. They thus require critical examination from the perspective of 
contemporary monetary systems. 
First, it is not clear at this level of abstraction what the costs are for a state-issued credit-money, and 
what economies could be achieved through the circulation of higher relative volumes of private 
credit-system liabilities. Second, contemporary payments systems have significantly furthered the 
‘dematerialisation’ of money identified by Marx. Electronic payments platforms, while imposing 
high fixed costs, have essentially zero marginal costs for higher volumes of transactions.22 This has 
effected considerable economies for social capital. But dematerialised electronic entries in bank-
operated payments systems have become money, and thus appear in every transaction. 
Third,  Marx’s  arguments  considerablencerning  credit  and  the  velocity  of  money  need  to  be 
considered deliberately and in turn. Marx identifies “technical” increases in money velocity arising 
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20 Tendencies exist for the equalisation of expected, risk-adjusted rates of profit, and the impact of credit on inventories 
needs to be considered dynamically, as discussed below.  
21 Volume II, Chapter 6. 
22 See Lapavitsas and dos Santos (2008). from credit relations. These involve the aforementioned netting out of claims, as well as reductions 
in  money reserves  held  by capitalists.  Overdraft arrangements  and  access to  short-term  credit 
markets (such as those  for commercial  paper)  may give capitalist enterprises ready,  on-demand 
access to money as it is needed.23 These reductions in money holdings relative to revenue flows 
amount to a dynamic increase in the pace at which capitalist sales revenues are reinvested, boosting 
profitability. 
But Marx  also argued that “The great regulator of the velocity of the currency is credit.”24 This 
regulation is understood  to arise  as capitalists make deposits with idle money funds, and those 
deposits are loaned to capitalists who will spend them more quickly than the depositor would have. 
If  parts  of  money hoards in  the  circuit of  capital  are  used  to  acquire  newly issued  corporate 
securities, and the resulting inflows are actually invested, this is effectively what happens. Money 
holders acquire either fixed (bonds) or variable (equity) claims on future profits. As a result, not 
only is money more quickly recommitted to investment, but prices for capital market assets are 
established. 
But Marx’s description clearly does not apply to  the  ex  nihilo  advance  of  bank  liabilities. All 
increases in the pace of investment will boost sales and profit flows and reduce the relative size of 
inventories. But increases in the pace of investment that is self-financed from previously unspent 
capitalist revenues, whether those were retained by the investor or raised from other capitalists via 
the  issuance of  non-monetary liabilities,  will  do  so  by increasing  the  aggregate  pace  at which 
capitalist revenues are recommitted to investment. Increases in the pace of borrowing will do so by 
increasing  the  total  volume of money in circulation. Credit relations thus do not unambiguously 
effect reductions in circulation capital.
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23 Notably, access to such funds does not affect accumulation funds, as their existence follows precisely from the need 
for social capital to hold money as money.
24 See Marx (1894), chapter 33.4.2 Credit, Investment and Real Accumulation
By supporting investment, higher sustained paces of net credit extension ensure commodities sell 
more quickly and aggregate inventories are smaller in relation to total capital value. The dynamic 
profitability of social capital rises as its turnover time is reduced. Considered at the aggregate level, 
the impact of the average pace of investment, own or leveraged, on the dynamic profitability of 
social capital gives rise  to potentially destabilising  accelerator effects. Higher (lower) aggregate 
profitability may induce quicker (slower) individual paces of overall investment, which will in turn 
further boost (taper) aggregate profitability. While this points to potential collective benefits arising 
from general increases in the individual paces of investment, the competitive character of capitalist 
appropriation rules out such coordination. 
Increases in the pace of borrowing will contribute to these processes, helping increase the rate of 
profit on aggregate social capital. They also open the possibility for leveraged gains for borrowing 
enterprises if the profitability of circulating capital exceeds the rate of interest. Leverage may thus 
give rise to a second potentially destabilising accelerator effect, as high (low) levels of profit of 
enterprise  may support increases  (decreases)  in  individual  levels  of  leverage  that,  by boosting 
aggregate  investment,  will  themselves  boost  (weaken)  the  aggregate  profitability  of  capitalist 
enterprises. 
Aggregate levels of leverage, given by outstanding  debt to total capital in circulation, emerge as 
important  determinants  of  aggregate  profitability.  They  also  condition  the  significance  of  the 
redistributions effected by interest payments, and of credit risk. Those levels develop as the result of 
the decisions of capitalist enterprises about how to fund expansions in investment. They may draw 
on fractions of previously realised profits, and on new credit. In this connection it is important to 
note that net loans extended will make a greater contribution to total capital value in circulation 
than to total debt outstanding. Net lending finances investment undertakings by borrowers of equal 
28value to the new debt obligations it creates. But it additionally provides monetary means for the 
realisation of profits by capitalists selling  either to borrowers or to workers employed by those 
borrowers. Net lending  thus contributes to the net worth of aggregate social capital  in the same 
measure in which it makes possible increases in the scale of investment financed from monetary 
profits.
The ability of credit to boost accumulation faces two broad constraints, productive and financial. 
Productive constraints arise as paces of investment, self-financed or leveraged, will only contribute 
to real accumulation if commodity output can keep up with the resulting quicker paces of demand. 
While net lending contributes both to demand and to investment that will lead to commodity output, 
these contributions are neither simultaneous nor commensurate.25 Inasmuch as the time-productivity 
of  labour  conditions  the  pace  at  which  commodity  output  emerges  following  investment, 
sufficiently high paces of expansion of investment may at exhaust or overly tax inventories. At this 
level of  abstraction, this potential  exhaustion sets the  limits for the  potential  positive  effects of 
credit relations on real accumulation. In such settings, further increases in the pace  of net credit 
extension will no longer quicken the pace of sales and profit realisation. They will  simply help 
trigger demand-pull inflation.26
The  pace  of credit extension at which this limit is reached will  be conditioned by the dynamic 
impact of credit on flows of commodity demand and supply. Consider the dynamic contribution to 
those flows of present net credit extension. The new money will contribute to future demand in 
accordance  with  the  pace  at  which  the  money is  once  again  spent  to  finance  production  or 
consumption. Its contribution to supply flows will hinge on the rate at which the monetary profits it 
helps realise are reinvested, expanding the scale of production, and the pace at which invested value 
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25 The allocation of credit between productive and consumption purposes, for instance, will shape the relationship 
between the dynamic contribution of credit to commodity demand and supply. See dos Santos (2011). 
26 As argued and modeled by Foley (1982). Note that at more concrete levels of analysis, paces of investment conducive 
to demand-pull inflation may be necessary to achieve broader aims, such as levels of employment or real wage growth. emerges  as  output  commodities.  The  limits  on  the  ability  of  net  credit  extension  to  boost 
profitability and rates of accumulation are thus defined by the rate of own investment funded from 
profits, the velocity of money, and the time-productivity of labour.27
The  financial  constraints stem  from the  inherent risks and  potential  disruptions posed by credit 
relations. Leveraged investment undertakings are haunted by the same systemic potential industrial 
and commercial crises that threaten all capitalist undertakings. But as borrowing  creates payment 
obligations, the effects of those disruptions will be more destructive. The possibility and incidence 
of bankruptcy become the fulcra of capitalist crises, spreading their effects by breaking chains of 
payments on which capitalist plans hitherto hinged. The credit system may itself become the source 
of crises, as disruptions to credit extension may themselves lead to breaks in payments chains. 
Significantly, by damaging the assets of banks supporting credit money, such breaks also threaten 
capital value in monetary form. Bank runs, attacks on national currencies, and the panicked search 
for the most general forms of money may follow, all of which severely strain the credit system’s 
ability to extend credit. These may follow as a distinctive financial moment of broader industrial 
and commercial crisis, as well as the result of self-fulfilling concerns by holders of credit-system 
liabilities about the quality of credit-system assets. The capitalist business cycle inherently exhibits 
distinctive credit moments, to which the next section turns. 
4.3 The Contradictions of Credit in Accumulation
While recognising the contribution of credit relations to accumulation and profitability, Marx also 
devoted considerable space to discussions of the distinctive contradictions they create for social 
capital.28 Those discussions may be applied to the approach to credit relations taken here in order to 
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27 See Foley (1982), or dos Santos (2011).
28 Discussions on these are scattered across part V of volume 3 of Capital. See de Brunhoff (1979), Part Two, § II for a 
robust distillation. obtain a broad Marxian description of the specific credit moments of the capitalist business cycle, 
which  operate quite apart from  the  specific underlying  processes in commodity production and 
exchange that may be understood to disrupt or challenge profitability. 
The  upswing  starts following  a  crisis and a  period of  recession.  In their  aftermath,  wages are 
typically low, as are the prices of capital and financial  assets and means of production. Balance 
sheets of enterprises that survived the previous crash will be generally strong, with little debt and 
large  relative  money  holdings.  In  such  a  setting  many  things  can  trigger  enhanced  profit 
expectations, often including the development of a new industry. As a result the aggregate pace of 
self-investment increases  and  enterprises  start  becoming  less  liquid.  This  increase  is  in  itself 
sufficient to enhance the dynamic profitability of aggregate capital in circulation, and, in the setting 
of  low  interest rates,  the  profitability of  capitalist  enterprises  net of  debt  servicing  payments.   
Enhanced profitability helps validate and deepen original expectations.
Concurrently, demand for credit rises. Given low existing levels of indebtedness and increasingly 
good prospects for enterprise profitability, the banking  system readily accommodates heightened 
demand for loans. Cross-border inflows of capital may ease constraints on the CMA’s ability to 
accommodate banking system lending decisions. Good and improving prospects on loans enhance 
confidence  on  the  banking  system  by money holders, who become  more  willing  to  hold bank 
liabilities, including  those with greater restrictions on their convertibility. Money holders become 
less  liquid,  as  do  banks.  The  resulting  heightened  paces of  credit  extension  further  boost the 
profitability of capital  in circulation. Given  the  low interest-rate  levels,  the  aggregate  financial 
robustness  of  capitalist  enterprises  continues  to  improve  as  greater  paces  of  credit  expansion 
increase aggregate profits by more than interest payments. Even if interest rates begin rising as the 
boom progresses, the rate of profit on circulating capital may rise even more quickly as the pace of 
overall investment continues to accelerate. 
31During this upswing competition propels enterprises and banks into increasingly illiquid positions, 
and the aggregate economy into ever higher levels of leverage. “Financial innovations” allowing 
greater levels of lending relative to erstwhile practices and regulatory constraints spread. While it 
lasts, the self-fulfilling high profitability proves irresistible to functioning and banking capital, even 
when a bust is acknowledged to be inevitable. “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things 
will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still 
dancing.” 
 
A plurality of developments can stop the music. Along traditional Marxian lines, mark-up rates may 
fall  as  the  cycle  progresses.  The  competitive  adoption  and  spread  of  labour-saving  technical 
innovation in some industries may reduce scopes for exploitation of labour-power. The boom may 
also  tighten  labour  markets,  leading  to  gains  in  real  wages  and  reductions  in  the  rate  of 
exploitation.29 Other Marxian contributions have pointed (unconvincingly) to disruptions in sales 
due to recurrent “disproportionalities” in the types of commodities produced, or to tendencies to 
“underconsumption” arising from lopsided distributions of income.30 It is also possible the boom 
eventually leads to increases in lending rates, including as a result of deliberate intervention by the 
CMA in the face of developing  inflationary pressures. Any of these developments is capable  of 
triggering falls in the paces of investment and in credit extension, both of which may also fall on 
purely speculative bases. 
What is  significant from  the  standpoint  of  the  account  offered  here  is  that falls  in  paces  of 
investment and borrowing  are in themselves sufficient to reduce profitability in their own right. 
Obligations  on  the  stocks  of  debt acquired  during  the  boom  raise  the  spectre  of  bankruptcy, 
changing the behaviour of enterprises. Seeking just to survive, they will scramble to get access to 
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29 As emphasised by the Uno School. See Uno (1980) or Itoh and Lapavitsas (1999).
30 See Day (1980) for an overview of the debates involving the former; see  Sweezy (1942) on the later. money as means of payment, reducing investment, thus exacerbating the crisis. Enterprises will also 
demand new credit to avoid bankruptcy.
The credit system will generally be in a poor position to meet this demand, despite the collective 
benefits that may arise if lending  is sustained through the crisis. Confidence in all but the most 
general  money  forms  may  disappear  suddenly,  greatly  curtailing  the  circulation  of  domestic 
liabilities. Even more so than investing, capitalists do not hold liabilities as a class. To sustain the 
circulation of its liabilities the CMA may have to increase rates on them dramatically (or restrict 
their convertibility). Souring portfolios, collapsing demand for bank liabilities, and highly illiquid 
positions inherited from the boom ensure banks find it difficult to accommodate loan demand, even 
if  CMA liabilities  are  cheaply available.  Rates  on  loans  spike,  particularly for  those  of  short 
maturities demanded to secure means of payment, exacerbating the financial distress of enterprises. 
The crisis is followed by a period of downswing, in which the same accelerator effects boosting 
profitability and the paces of investment and borrowing  that conditioned the boom play out in the 
exact opposite direction. Not only are capitalist revenues reduced, but they are also significantly 
used to repair enterprise and bank balance sheets through falls in the paces of own investment and 
reductions in gross credit demand. Interest rates fall, as do wages and prices of capital assets and 
means of production. Those movements lay the basis for a new upswing as soon as the protracted 
process of deleveraging of surviving enterprises has run its course. 
5. Conclusions
This paper has advanced a distinctive, Marxian approach to the content, limits and contradictions of   
credit relations. At the broadest level their centrality to capitalist accumulation is understood to stem 
from  their  role  in  providing  the  expanding  means  for  monetary  expression  of  capital  values 
necessary  for  accumulation.  They  develop  spontaneously  as  capitalist  investment  plans 
33systematically include demand for credit, met in the first instance by commercial credit. Banking 
credit generalises commercial credit relations, and is founded on pools of money developing in the 
circuit of capital and in circuits of personal income. Those hoards provide dynamic scopes for the 
circulation of bank liabilities issued ex nihilo, to the extent that those are accepted as monetary 
expressions for  capital  value and  stores of wealth.  Their  magnitude  and distribution relative to 
production (and consumption) plans conditions the demand for credit. The forms in which holders 
are willing to maintain them condition the ability of the credit system to accommodate that demand. 
Issuers of monetary liabilities need  to support their circulation  with the quality of their  assets, 
capital and fractional reserves, and the terms of convertibility and interest rates on them. This may 
constrain  the ability of the CMA to accommodate paces of credit granted by the banking system. 
The rate of interest on loans comes to be understood not as a simple exogenous monetary policy 
choice, but as a consequence of the rates of interest necessary to ensure the circulation of domestic 
bank and CMA liabilities, as well as of the costs and profits of the banking sector. In the resulting, 
distinctive  loanable-funds approach  to interest, rates are  shaped  by “supply factors”,  even  in a 
setting of ex nihilo issuance of bank liabilities. 
Credit extension can support sales and profit flows, leading to reductions in the relative magnitude 
of inventory stocks, and boosting  the  profitability of  social  capital. Scopes for  such boosts are 
limited by the exhaustion of inventories. This hinges in turn on the pace of own investment and the 
dynamic productivity of labour, which fundamentally constrain accumulation. Credit relations also 
create  distinctive  contradictions  for  social  capital.  They enhance  the  impact  of  disruptions  to 
commodity sales, as those come to threaten capital value in monetary form. They also exacerbate 
and  compound  business-cycle  fluctuations,  which come  to include  sharp disruptions created  by 
bankruptcies. 
34Social capital is forced constantly to negotiate between the benefits and risks inherently posed by 
credit. The competitive market process ensures this negotiation is not pursued on the basis of the 
collective performance of capital as a whole. Profitability signals promote destabilising behaviour 
over  the  cycle.  Individual  appropriation  ensures  industrial  and  commercial  crises  constantly 
threaten explosive monetary crises and destructive falls in credit extension, precisely at the time 
those  are  most  damaging. These  contradictions are  inherent to  the  credit monetary form, and, 
consequently, to the process of capital accumulation that relies on them. 
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